EGYPT
Written by Nadine Wallnöfer

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Profile

  • Area: 1,001,450 square kilometres
  • Population: approx. 94.6 Mio.
  • Capital: Cairo
  • State form: presidential republic
  • Official language: Arabic (official), English, French
  • Religion: Sunni Islam (90 per cent), Christianity

  • Flag of Egypt

    Analysis
    Abstract
    The “25 January Revolution” in 2011 had raised great hopes among the Egyptian people, for a new Egypt, a democracy with “bread, freedom and social justice” for everyone. Six years and four regimes later, it is clear these hopes were mostly in vain: the country officially has a democratic constitution, but reality shows that those words on paper can’t do much against the autocratic military regime of president al-Sisi. In 2016, Egypt has repeatedly been amongst the top three of the worst jailers of journalists worldwide and president al-Sisi is on the Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF) “list of press freedom predators” since 2014. Journalists must fear to lose their job, to be imprisoned, tortured or even killed if they report anything negative against the Egyptian government, the military or the president. Vaguely formulated laws and their arbitrary interpretation allow the security forces to easily pin their crimes against their opponents on national security reasons, like the “support for terrorist organisations”. Consequently, Egypt is only ranked 159th out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom 2016 Index by RSF and as “not free” in Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Press 2016” report.
    Communication policy and regulations
    Form of government
    During the Arab Spring, in 2011, the Egyptian “25 January Revolution” led to president Hosni Mubarak’s deposition after 30 years in power. Until a new parliament was in place in early 2012, Egypt’s military led the country. Mohammed Morsi won the presidential election later that year, but after violent protests against his government and the Muslim Brotherhood in spring 2013, the military under the leadership of defence minister al-Sisi, overthrew Morsi again and replaced him with interim president Adly Mansour in July 2013 (CIA, 2017). Today, six years after the revolution, Egypt’s form of government is a presidential republic with president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as head of state. The former defence minister and general was elected president in 2014, after the new Egyptian constitution had come into force. This constitution determines that the Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic constitutional state. In 2015, Egypt elected the first parliament since 2012 (Foreign Office, 2017a; CIA, 2017). These elections “were marred by large-scale rigging, criminalization of and boycotts by opposition parties, and a tight grip on the media” (Puddington & Roylance, 2016).
    According to Freedom House (2016a), furthermore, there are still major problems like corruption, excessive military power, arbitrariness, discrimination, low turnouts in elections (due to little trust in their fairness) and many more, standing in the way of a functioning democracy in Egypt. Therefore, Freedom House ranked Egypt as “not free” in its “Freedom of the World 2016” report.

    Legislation and jurisdiction
    In Egypt, the Islamic Sharia is the main source of legislation (Foreign Office, 2017a) which is ensured by Article 2 of the constitution. The Preamble of the new constitution of 2014 emphasizes the pride of the Egyptian people for their country: statements like “the Arab nation of Egypt is the heart of the whole world”, or calling Egyptian cultural achievements “the most amazing wonders of civilization” demonstrate a very strong patriotism (Constitute, 2016: 10-12). Additionally, influences of Napoleonic civil and penal law and colonial-era laws can still be recognised in today’s legal system. The judicial review of the constitutionality of laws and the interpretation of the principles lies within the body of the Supreme Constitutional Court (CIA, 2017).
    The 2014 constitution determines that “the state is subject to the law, while the independence, immunity and impartiality of the judiciary are essential guarantees for the protection of rights and freedoms” (Article 94). Due to Article 95 “crimes and penalties may only be based on the law, and penalties may only be inflicted by a judicial ruling.” and according to Article 96, an accused person “is innocent until proven guilty in a fair court of law” (Constitute, 2016: 29). Also, on paper, everyone has the right to defend themselves and Article 54 guarantees the right to be only questioned when having legal support from a lawyer – provided for by the state if necessary (ibid.: 21-22). Unfortunately, the government doesn’t seem to feel bound to these laws and reality looks very different.
    Apart from the legal system mentioned above, there also are the largely criticised military courts: Actually, Article 204 states that “Civilians cannot stand trial before military courts except for crimes that represent a direct assault against military facilities, military barracks, or whatever falls under their authority (…) or crimes that represent a direct assault against its officers or personnel because of the performance of their duties” (ibid.: 51). But Freedom House (2016a) indicates that “these rights have not been enforced in practice, and the charter suffers from significant flaws, including an expansion of police and military autonomy and a provision allowing military trials of civilians.”. In their “Freedom in the World 2016” report, they accuse president al-Sisi of ruling “in a style that entrenches military privilege and shields the armed forces from accountability for their actions.”
    Concerning the media, Article 70 of the constitution officially enshrines freedom of the press. It also states that everybody has the right to own and issue newspapers and to establish visual, audio and digital media outlets. Article 71 prohibits the censorship, confiscation, suspension or shut down of Egyptian newspapers and media outlets in any way, except in times of war or general mobilization. It also eliminates jail terms for media offenses. Article 72 states that “the state shall ensure the independence of all press institutions and owned media outlets, in a way that ensures their neutrality and expressing all opinions, political and intellectual trends and social interests; and guarantees equality and equal opportunity in addressing public opinion” (Constitute, 2016: 24-25). As mentioned above, constitutional rights are not taken seriously by the Egyptian authorities, so these rights are rather worthless for journalists in reality.
    Article 211 determines that the independent National Media Council (NMC) is responsible for “guaranteeing and protecting the freedom of press and media stipulated in the Constitution” and “safeguarding its independence, neutrality, plurality and diversity, preventing monopolistic practices” on the one hand. On the other hand, the NMC is supposed to monitor “the legality of the sources of funding of press and media institutions” and to establish “the controls and regulations necessary to ensure the commitment of press and media outlets to adhere to professional and ethical standards, and national security needs as set out by law” (ibid.: 53). The independent National Press and Media Association (NPMA) is supposed to manage state-owned press and media institutions, television, radio and digital media outlets. It “ensures their development, independence, neutrality and their adherence to sensible professional, administrative and economic standards” (Articles 212 & 213). Both, the NMC and the NPMA are to be consulted about bills and regulations pertaining to their field of operation (ibid.). But until now, Egypt has failed to establish these independent media regulators (Freedom House, 2016b). Instead, an Egyptian professor for political communication and journalist explained that the Ministry of Information which he calls a “propaganda ministry”, is still controlling the media, with reinforced powers. The official justification is, again, terrorism and the country’s instability.

    Restrictions and censorship
    Although Article 71 of the constitution forbids censorship, as mentioned above, “the government uses national security and stability as grounds for its constant attacks on media pluralism and independence” (Reporters Without Borders, 2016a). Furthermore, Article 71 “leaves room for imprisonment for crimes related to incitement of violence, discrimination, and defamation” (Freedom House, 2016b). Moreover, constitutional rights can be restricted by simple laws which is a big problem of the 2014 constitution (Foreign Office, 2017b). After the “25 January Revolution”, all the consecutive governments have imposed measures restricting journalists’ freedom to control the media. At the moment, a “Sisification” of the media and a witch-hunt against the now-banned Muslim Brotherhood can be watched under president al-Sisi. For example, a new anti-terrorism law from 2015, obliges journalists to only report the official version of “terrorist” attacks, on national security grounds (Reporters Without Borders, 2016b).
    Violations can lead to “heavy fines and a one-year ban from the practice of journalism” what makes free reporting on areas affected by terrorism and insurgency extremely difficult for journalists. And despite the promising new constitution, the existing press laws and penal code remained in place, including a number of articles “that can be used to imprison journalists”. That means that for example, defamation is still a criminal offense and blasphemy, ridiculing or insulting religion and endangering national unity can lead to prison sentences of up to five years (Freedom House, 2016b). The 2014 constitution unfortunately “fails to specify the composition and appointment procedures for regulatory bodies, meaning future legislation could create structures that enable political influence”. Moreover, the al-Sisi administration has still not made any progress on drafting the freedom of information legislation that is being debated since 2013 (ibid.). Consequently, the vague formulation and interpretation of laws stays a major problem, since it makes it very easy to silence dissenting voices.
    Although, in contrast to the Iranian constitution, there is no explicit media mission to “propagate the Islamic culture” mentioned in the Egyptian constitution, the media are clearly pressured to fulfil an indirect media mission: the Egyptian regime is using them to justify and praise their actions and to make them appear patriotic and necessary for national security.
    Media offers
    As stated by Ayman Salah, a digital entrepreneur, television still is the most important source of information in Egypt, followed by the internet (including mobile internet) and then newspapers. The high popularity of TV could be explained by the still high illiteracy rate: in 2015, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) reported that only about 76 per cent of the adults over 15 could read and write in Egypt. In this report a large generation gap becomes visible, since the literacy rate is only about 43 percent among the population above 65 years but over 93 per cent for the young between 15 and 24 years (UIS, 2016). Furthermore, it is difficult to assess trends in media ownership, spending, revenues, and advertising because of the industry’s opacity. State media are supported directly by the government and also through advertising “although it is unclear what types of advertising subsidies exist”. Because of Egypt’s weak economy, both state-owned and private outlets have been forced to reduce their budgets. Thus, “shutdowns, layoffs, and cuts to content were common across the media industry” (Freedom House, 2016b). There are three news agencies that are important in Egypt, according to the German foreign office: the state owned Middle East News Agency (MENA), the ONA, a private news agency that belongs to ONTV and the independent news agency Aswat Masriya which was built up by the Thomson Reuters Foundation in 2011 (Foreign Office, 2017a).

    Broadcasting
    As already mentioned above, television is the most important source of information for the Egyptian people. The Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), the state-owned broadcaster, is Egypt’s only terrestrial broadcaster that controls a range of regional and specialty channels. But although it has grown tremendously into an inflated structure over the past years, “its programming is among the least popular in the country, with audiences increasingly turning to privately owned Egyptian satellite television channels, or those based in the Gulf Arab states”. Consequently, the government started a five-year restructuring process of ERTU in 2015, to reduce its considerable debt and to improve its programming. Freedom House expects that it will “privatize several of its media properties during the restructuring process”. ERTU is still managed directly by the Minister of Information and has approximately 43,000 employees in its 30 television and nine radio networks (El Issawi & Cammaerts, 2016: 553; Freedom House, 2016b). ERTU is broadcasting on a number of satellite channels like Nile News, Nile TV, Nile Drama etc., as well as on ten terrestrial channels, partly with a local focus. Then there are also numerous private, commercial TV channels like for example, Dream TV, Al-Mehwar, Al-Hayat, ONTV, CBC and Al–Tahrir (Foreign Office, 2017a).
    The state-owned radio station Radio Cairo is reaching most of the bigger cities through Radio Misr, which is mostly broadcasting news. Moreover, Radio Cairo has overseas programmes in more than 30 languages. Examples for private music channels are Nogoom, Nile FM etc. (ibid.). After the revolution, there was a mushrooming of private media. This included for example the introduction of religious channels, which “were, however, immediately shut down after the military coup, confirming again the strong link between media and politics in Egypt”. But even now, there are still new private media outlets emerging. The funding of these media conglomerates is not very transparent, though (El Issawi & Cammaerts, 2016: 553-554). An Egyptian political scientist and documentary filmmaker, also remarked that especially the commercial media are vulnerable to self-censorship because of their dependence on commercial interests.

    Print
    The Egyptian print sector is divided into state owned, private and party press. The governmental “national press” consists of six publishing houses whose ownership structure is solidly linked to the political system. Thus, they are very supportive to the government and have no editorial independence. Similar to the broadcasting sector, there was a rise in new private, alternative media outlets after the revolution (El Issawi & Cammaerts, 2016: 553-554), but the al-Sisi government is working hard to silence them.
    Today there are more than 500 newspapers, magazines, journals, and other periodicals, and several important state-owned titles. But although Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world, print media only have a limited circulation: even the circulations of the largest newspapers are less than a million (Freedom House, 2016). The two most important state financed newspapers are Al-Ahram and Al-Akhbar (Foreign Office, 2017a). Especially the Al-Ahram was repeatedly mentioned as very loyal to the government by the interviewed experts. For that reason, they do not trust it’s news. Among the most important Egyptian private newspapers are the Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Shorouk, Al-Watan and Al-Tahrir (Foreign Office, 2017a). Some of the experts who worked for private newspapers reported, that even there the freedom of expression is very limited and strictly bound to the editorial policy of the owner. By overestimating their freedom, journalists risk to lose their jobs. Egypt also has a wide-ranging party press. Here the most important papers are the Al-Wafd, of the Neo-Wafd-Party, the Nasserist Al-Arabi, Karama of the left national party, the left socialist Al-Ahali, the liberal party’s Al-Ahrar and the Coptic weekly Watani (Foreign Office, 2017a).
    As reported by a journalist, publishing houses with their “printing machines” and “publishing presses” are owned and controlled by government officials. Thus, they can strongly pressure private newspapers by simply not printing them if they write something anti governmental. This certainly leads to self-censorship, too.

    Internet
    In 2015, the internet penetration in Egypt was about 36 percent but nearly 70 percent had access to mobile phones. Around 28 million Egyptians use Facebook which is approximately 30 percent of all Facebook users in the Arab world. Today, social media (especially Facebook and Twitter) are very important for diffusing news and information (Freedom House, 2016b).
    In the opinion of professor Naila Hamdy from the American University in Cairo, today the internet is an important tool to spread (alternative) information in Egypt: “Internet plays a huge role. Our very fist bloggers began around the year of 2004 and by 2007 Egypt had become a breeding ground of bloggers: They were really, really important. They have been important not just as a source of information, but as a direct push toward a revolution. When the revolution actually started, most bloggers had moved on to a new platform: Facebook. The technology on Facebook was easier to handle and it guaranteed the bloggers a wider audience”. She also agreed that the internet is the medium in Egypt, where people could speak freest. This is the reason, why the Mubarak government blocked the internet access during the uprisings in 2011 (Bruns, Highfield & Burgess, 2013: 873; Howard & Hussain, 2011: 44).
    Although the Egyptian revolution is often referred to as the “Facebook” or “Twitter revolution” by the West, Egyptians keep emphasising on how much more, especially human bravery, than just simply these digital technologies it took to overthrow the Mubarak regime (Wilkins, 2012: 49-50). Besides Facebook and Twitter, also YouTube played an important role during the revolution. It helped in “documenting the details of the different events of the revolution in different cities and areas in Egypt” and telling “the stories of the victims of police brutality”. Revolutionaries also used social media for mobilizing “and keeping the revolutionary spirit up through using emotional songs and poems” and “following and commenting on mainstream media coverage of the events” (Elghamry, 2015: 262). On the one side, Hamdy and other interviewed experts correspondingly named the internet as their source for independent information because they generally have no trust in the state-controlled traditional media. On the other hand, the interviewed experts reported that the regime is more and more using the web for its own purpose, by distributing fake news and disinformation online. Furthermore, everyone who is posting oppositional views is fiercely tracked down and brought “to justice”.
    Journalists' autonomy
    Education and professionalization
    According to Professor Hamdy “about 70 or 80 per cent of journalists in Egypt graduate with a degree in journalism and mass communication” and “99 percent have a college degree”. In Hamdy’s opinion there are many journalism schools and programmes at universities but their quality varies strongly: The best and most prominent programme is the one at the American University in Cairo but it is very expensive and only takes very few elite students. The “handful” of absolvents from these top universities tend to make fast and good careers and get very influential positions. All in all, she thinks that the private universities are better because they have smaller classes and more practical training. Private universities and schools are for example connected to and financed by newspapers, foreign countries, foundations or NGOs. Sometimes this can bring up different opinions on how good journalism should look like: Unlike in Western countries, Egyptian journalists for example “are much more involved in their work, they much more have a clearly stated opinion” and they “feel that they have to teach people”. Due to Hamdy, especially in universities in rural areas, the journalistic education is very weak. She says they have a mostly theoretical curriculum, “because it’s cheaper and easier”. Furthermore, the national universities have very high numbers of students and thus up to 500 students in a class. According to Hamdy, this is problematic because in this way “can’t give you very good training”.

    State repression and punishment
    Before the revolution “the Mubarak regime kept a tight grip on broadcasters while the intelligence services enforced certain red lines, but Egyptian newspapers featured regular criticism, independent columnists, and critical journalists”. Consequently, “Egypt’s media had evolved into a mix of state-run dinosaurs, respected private daily newspapers, and pugnacious tabloids, joined more recently by activist blogs and social media” (Lynch, 2015: 94). During the revolution, Egyptian media became “an important forum from which politicians, journalists, and social advocates began an earnest campaign to influence, educate, inform, and persuade citizens” (Hamdy, 2013: 1). Right after the revolution, all the interviewed experts agreed that the media sector was flourishing with inspiration and hope for change and diversity. But “after an initial period of unprecedented media freedom”, along with the Mursi government “alarming signs of substantial setbacks for media freedoms emerged” again (Hamdy, 2013: 5).
    Six years after the revolution, Egypt’s media are still not free: Instead of impartial regulatory mechanisms, mostly political or security concerns drive decisions on media operations. Moreover, numerous cases of TV programme suspensions (at private outlets) or withdrawals of print and online articles “for crossing certain redlines in their reporting” have been documented by the Egyptian Journalists’ Syndicate. Any strong criticism of president al-Sisi is side-lined or suppressed. The reporting of the public and private outlets is largely pro-Sisi, strongly supporting the security forces and anti–Muslim Brotherhood. The president is frequently meeting with prominent newspaper editors and television presenters in private, to discourage critical reporting and urge journalists “to produce material aimed at inspiring national unity”. Especially during the 2015 parliamentary election period, “the already high rate of media freedom violations spiked” (Freedom House, 2016b). For example, an Egyptian online-journalist reported that media owners held back other online-journalist’s salaries to pressure them into supporting their agenda.
    With 25 journalists in prison, Egypt was the third-worst jailer of journalists in 2016 worldwide, right after the number one Turkey (81) and the number two China (38), according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). Furthermore, Egyptian journalists, bloggers and media outlets continually live in fear of arbitrary licensing and registration processes, legal prosecution, gag orders, disciplinary action for straying from government narratives, editorial pressure or even direct censorship at public and private outlets. Other common methods to silence journalists are assaults, detainment (often without a charge), surveillance, confiscation of their equipment, physical attacks by both security forces and civilians or other draconian measures, even torture or death (Freedom House, 2016b; Human Rights Watch, 2017).
    Since president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s regime is in power, the Muslim Brotherhood is branded as a terrorist organization. Journalists and media outlets that are said to be sympathetic to them are silenced. The extensive government harassment in Egypt has led to a widespread self-censorship and thus, al-Sisi loyalists are dominating the overall discourse (Kasparova, 2016). The phenomenon of the disappearances of unwanted persons, who are only partially coming back from the custody of the security authorities, continues to grow (Foreign Office, 2017b) and there have been numerous reports of torture or other mistreatment (Freedom Hose, 2016b). Originally, according to Article 52 of the 2014 constitution “all forms of torture are a crime with no statute of limitations”. Article 54 states that personal freedom is a natural right and a citizen can only be arrested “in cases of in flagrante delicto”, “shall be immediately informed of the causes therefor, notified of their rights in writing, be allowed to immediately contact their family and lawyer”. Furthermore, “Judgment must be rendered within a week from such recourse, otherwise the petitioner shall be immediately released” (Constitute, 2016: 21-22). Yet, the members of the security forces who are responsible for these drastic violations of the law mentioned above, are not held accountable for their crimes (Human Rights Watch, 2017). In case of doubt, they will always make excuses on national security reasons, like claiming the victims are supporters of a terrorist organisation.
    There also is a Press Syndicate in Egypt, which has always been “a safe place” for journalists that fought for their rights and offered them shelter if needed. But in 2016, for the first time “the Egyptian Press Syndicate has been taken to court by the state” – because it harboured two falsely charged journalists. This event clearly “marks a significant escalation in the repression of the press in Egypt” (Al Jazeera, 2016). Reporters Without Borders have already added president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to their “list of press freedom predators” in 2014. Egypt has fallen from rank 127 in the 2010 World Press Freedom Index before the Arab Spring to 159th out of 180 countries in the 2016 Index. Equally, the country declined from rank 65 out of 100 in Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Press 2011” report to 77 in the 2016. At least, some of the interviewed experts felt that the experience of the revolution, the knowledge that they could change something, has given the Egyptian journalists a new confidence that nobody can take away anymore.

    Journalist’s role and self-perception
    The traditional role of the media in Egypt is conformity to the interests of the political masters. Particularly radio and television journalists have been expected to collaborate and provide support to state discourse. For decades, Egyptian journalists were rather defending those in power than questioning or challenging them. Right after the revolution this changed for the first time: topics that used to be strictly forbidden were tackled by journalists, officials were challenged by talk show hosts in their studios, and even in state media opposing views could be heard (El Issawi & Cammaerts, 2016: 553-555).
    Naila Hamdy described the new journalistic self-perception in an interview in 2013 as follows: “The Egyptian journalist clearly feels like a direct agent of social change. They feel that they have to change society. They have to inform citizens in a very broad way, because many people are very ignorant, not well educated and don’t know anything about democracy”. But she also addressed the reputation of Egyptian journalists as their major problem: “Within the last 20 or 30 years the perceived image of journalists got worse and worse, because they were not credible, they were either a mouth piece of the government or they didn’t fight back this kind of influence. Within the journalistic field, their self-image was not very high, either”. Yasser Khalil, an Egyptian journalist and researcher agrees with this impression: „Some people see us as liars, a little number see us as heroes and the defender of ethics and rights. An increasing number of people show disrespect to journalists after the revolution, the continuous campaign against media affected journalists’ reputation too much”. Magdy Samaan, another Egyptian journalist confirmed that “the image of journalists in Egypt is not that good because the public doesn’t see the professional practice. You will find lots of media criticism in the public sphere”. But back in 2013, before al-Sisi’s presidency, Hamdy also believed that “this has changed tremendously in the last two years.” and that “it will continue to develop because journalists, as a group, believe in their ability to be an important part of social change”.
    Unfortunately, this new freedom only lasted for a very short while. With the new autocratic regime of al-Sisi in power “the debate on professional journalism is not relevant anymore, even for journalists”. Again, the media are collaborating with the regime, praising the military and calling for repressive measures against “the terrorists”, how all political opponents are labelled systematically (El Issawi & Cammaerts, 2016: 553-555).

    Foreign journalists and NGOs
    Foreign journalists and correspondents are also affected by the arbitrariness of the Egyptian security forces: Reporters Without Borders (2016a) and Freedom House (2016b) both wrote about measures like expulsion, travel bans, imprisonment and even death sentences taken against foreign journalists under the al-Sisi regime. Sometimes, because they allegedly supported terrorist organizations or were a threat to national security but often no charges were mentioned at all. Most of the interviewed experts also explained, that right after the revolution, foreign journalists were very welcome in Egypt and people were happy to talk to them about their country and their opinions. This positivity has given way to a suspicion and hostility during the changing regimes over the past six years. Now it can be dangerous, especially for female foreign journalists, to be attacked or sexually assaulted. Reporters Without Borders even made the recommendation not to send female foreign journalists to Egypt anymore. According to the interviewees, the willingness to talk to foreign journalists is still very low among the Egyptians. The openness and enthusiasm is gone. Some were even advised not to tell anyone that they are journalists.
    NGOs “dedicated to protecting journalists’ rights and freedom of expression have long been subject to restrictive laws that apply to all civil society groups”. According to a decree that al-Sisi signed in 2014 the penal code now bans foreign funding for activities that “harm the national interest,” which can possibly affect NGOs. On the report of Freedom House, “violations of the law can be punished with life imprisonment and fines of nearly $70,000, and the death penalty would apply if the offender is a public servant or linked to terrorism” (Freedom House, 2016b). This is also observed with great concern by organisations like Amnesty International (2016) and Human Rights Watch (2017). 6. Sources
    Sources

    Interviewed experts

    All interviews have been conducted by Angela Gruber and Sonja Salzburger between January 23, 2013 and February 6, 2013, for a seminar paper at LMU Munich and by Angela Gruber between April and June 2014, for her Master Thesis at LMU. The author thanks Ms. Gruber and Ms. Salzburger for their work, without which this country report wouldn’t have been possible.

    Interviews in 2013
    • Naila Hamdy, Professor at the American University in Cairo and former journalist
    • Yasser Khalil, Egyptian journalist and researcher
    • Magdy Samaan, Egyptian journalist
    • Cornelia Wegerhoff, ARD correspondent in Cairo
    • Martin Gehlen, Tagesspiegel correspondent in Cairo
    • Ayman Salah, Egyptian digital entrepreneur

    Interviews in 2014
    • Egyptian professor for political communication and journalist
    • Egyptian online-journalist
    • Egyptian political scientist and documentary filmmaker
    • Katharina Pfannkuchen, German journalist with focus on Northern Africa, speaks Arabic
    • Egyptian journalist and activist
    • Esther Saoub, former ARD correspondent in Cairo


    References
    Related Links
    Recommended citation form
    Nadine Wallnöfer: Egypt. In: Michael Meyen (ed.), Mapping Media Freedom. LMU Munich: Department of Communication Studies and Media Research 2017. http://mappingmediafreedom.de/egypt/ (access date).


    Egyptian journalists continue to protest 'restrictions' on freedoms of the press. Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4Cx7FGHmhg

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